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Yee: Formal Properties as the Basis for Value in Music

Bruce Baugh makes a helpful distinction between “form” and “matter” in
music. He defines form as the intrinsic elements of a musical piece’s composition
and matter as “the way music feels to the listener.”1 The remainder of this paper
will refer to what Baugh calls the “form” of music as “formal properties” and
“matter” as “non-formal properties.” After making this distinction, Baugh
proceeds to argue that what makes a piece of rock music good is its non-formal
properties rather than its formal properties. It is tempting to make a similar claim
for music generally, namely that it is the non-formal properties of a piece of
music that give it the value it has qua music. However, in this paper I will argue
that a musical piece’s formal properties, rather than its non-formal properties, are
what give it its value qua music. I will offer two arguments to support this thesis.
These arguments will attempt to show that non-formal properties are inadequate
as a basis for value in music, and that it must be the music’s formal properties that
give a piece of music value qua music. I will then raise and attempt to refute
objections that might be raised against my conclusion.
The argument against non-formal properties as an adequate basis for value
in music is as follows:
1. If non-formal properties are the basis for value in music, then
value in music is not objective.
2. Value in music is objective.
3. Therefore, non-formal properties are not the basis for value in
music.
By describing value in music as “objective,” I mean that there is a correct
answer to whether a piece of music is better or worse than another or good/bad at
all. If value in music were not objective then there would be no correct answer to
whether a piece of music was valuable or even more/less valuable than another.
Put into other words, objectivity in musical value means that some musical pieces
will be better or worse simpliciter than others.
It now becomes apparent why non-formal properties cannot be a basis for
objective musical value. Since non-formal properties are concerned with how a
piece of music makes us respond, they cannot ground a judgment that a piece of
music is good or bad simpliciter. If music were valued based on non-formal
properties, then its value would depend on the evaluative responses of agents,
which are prone to vary widely. We would have to conclude that while a
Beethoven piece has greater value than a Justin Bieber song for the virtuoso
pianist, it has less value for the thirteen-year old girl. If value in music is
subjective, then there is no way to arbitrate between the appropriateness of these
1. Bruce Baugh, “Prolegomena to Any Aesthetics of Rock Music,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism vol. 51, no. 1 (1993): 23.
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two responses. The best this approach can hope for is reaching a statistical
average of what music tends to please most people, but this hardly seems to be
what we mean when we say that a piece of music is good or bad.
In order to show that value in music is objective, I encourage readers to
find a recording of the song Pahpam Jarkwa, taken from the Canela tribe of
Brazilian natives. Mere verbal description cannot do justice to the experience.
When listeners hear the song, their response is one of revulsion, often manifesting
as tension in posture, displeased facial expressions, or even sounds of disgust and
incredulous laughter. When we react with aversion to the song, we are not simply
conveying a belief that the piece is ugly, but that it is bad music. This reaction
commits those who have it to the claim that value in music is objective. Those
who would deny having this commitment must explain their aversion to a
particular piece of music as merely a matter of preference-taste rather than a
belief that it was truly bad—and that is a bullet I and many others are unwilling to
bite.
A potential objection arises here. If non-formal properties are the basis for
value in music, then one of the best and most common candidates for what makes
music good or bad is how much pleasure or displeasure it brings us (though there
are other candidates, naturally). Can one not simply say that it is the fact that
Pahpam Jarkwa brings one displeasure that makes it bad music? Thus, our
aversion would be reducible to non-formal properties after all. Unfortunately, the
objection falls short. The Canela tribe that sung the piece considered the song
quite pleasurable, holding that kind of sound as the very paradigm of beauty. But
the fact that the tribe derives pleasure from Pahpam Jarkwa does nothing to
undermine our sense that the song is bad music. What is pleasurable is not always
good; as a clear counter-example, that a man can derive pleasure from rape
fantasies does not make those fantasies good, despite the pleasure they can yield.
And if he were to carry out the rape, we would reject any appeal he might make to
the pleasure he derived from the act to justify it. I will return later to the question
of whether pleasure in music makes it good.
The above argument has attempted to show that we are committed to the
objectivity of value in music and that the non-formal properties of a piece of
music do not provide a basis for this objectivity. Now, however, I would like to
offer a distinct elimination argument as to why formal properties are the best basis
for value in music:
1. Value in music is based primarily on one of the following: its
cognitive payoff, its moral payoff, its emotional payoff, its novelty,
its influence in the art-world, or its formal properties.
2. Value in music is not based primarily on cognitive payoff.
3. Value in music is not based primarily on moral payoff.
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4. Value in music is not based primarily on emotional payoff.
5. Value in music is not based primarily on novelty.
6. Value in music is not based primarily on influence in the artworld.
7. Therefore, value in music is primarily based on its formal
properties.
This seems to me to be an exhaustive list of the plausible candidates for
giving music value. The first five options are essentially an elaboration on
different kinds of non-formal properties that could be the basis of value in music.
They are the usual non-formal properties that laymen, critics, and aestheticians
alike might appeal to as forming the basis for value in music. I am more than
happy to entertain other candidates to add the list if they should arise, but for now
it seems safe to treat the above list as exhaustive.
In regard to Premise 1, why think that value in music must be primarily
based upon one of the options listed? Why not simply say that all of them
contribute to the value of a piece and that there is no hierarchy amongst them? Of
course it can be the case that all of the factors listed above contribute to a work’s
value, but it seems that a primary factor is necessary for objective value. This is
true especially since most of the proposed criteria are non-formal properties,
which are response-dependent and therefore cannot ground objective value in
music. If all of the factors in the list contribute equally to the value of a work, the
weight of a piece’s non-formal properties would easily outweigh the quality of its
formal properties. If this were the case, then music’s value would be responsedependent and vary widely, inadequate as a basis for objective evaluation.
In regards to Premise 2, it strikes me that speaking of cognitive payoff in
music is largely irrelevant and ineffective as a criterion for evaluating music. By
“cognitive payoff,” I mean the ability of an artwork to convince us of something
true or give us justification for true belief. Arguing that cognitive payoff
contributes to value even in narrative art like literature or film is difficult enough,
and even more so for music, which is a non-referential medium. Music is nonreferential in that the elements of music such as melodies, harmonic progressions,
and rhythms do not have consistent referents as words do, making it nearly
impossible to convey a clear and consistent message. Unlike in visual art, where
objects and shapes correspond to concrete objects or associations in a viewer’s
mind, music only creates certain states or moods, which gives it nowhere near the
kind of specificity needed in order to have significant cognitive payoff. Music
cannot be about things without words, images, or an associated narrative to
contextualize it. This makes attempts to value music based on cognitive payoff
difficult, perhaps even futile.
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Now we turn to the possibility that a piece’s moral payoff is what gives it
value. By “moral payoff,” I mean an artwork’s ability to make us more prone to
do what is right or good than we already were. Jerrold Levinson argues that the
moral payoff of a piece of music should be considered as a candidate criterion for
musical value:
[Some] music, properly grasped, exerts, through the attitudes or
states of mind the music projects or the complexes of feeling it
evokes, a humanizing and moralizing force, . . . all things being
equal, people exposed to such music tend to be morally better,
more humane, than they would otherwise be.2
The quotation is given in full because Levinson’s remarks seem to suffer from a
lack of clarity. Levinson does not explain how music acts as a humanizing and
moralizing force, nor does he give examples of musical works that do this. His
claims here strike me as implausible because he leaves the way that music
supposedly makes people more moral and humane ambiguous. Music is a nonreferential medium, so it is unclear how it is supposed to teach any moral lessons
or duties. Elsewhere he posits that music helps listeners treat other people as ends
in themselves by increasing the listeners’ awareness of others’ subjectivity,3 but
again this suffers from unclarity. Music increases our awareness of whom? The
composer? Characters of an imagined narrative? Other listeners? If music is nonreferential and cannot convey propositional content, it is hard to see how it
conveys any information about others’ perspectives. The most promising thought
is that music expresses the emotions and perspective of the composer, but this
rests on the false assumption that the composer always feels or possesses the
emotion or mood the music conveys. In any case, Levinson admits that good
music does not always morally improve listeners, so a piece’s moral payoff does
not seem adequate to ground objective musical value.4 In addition, he concedes
that a moral response to music of the sort he describes has not yet been proven to
be regular enough to be worth considering as a primary criterion for evaluating a
piece of music’s worth.5
More promising than valuing cognitive and moral payoff in a musical
work is the claim that emotional payoff gives music value. A common
manifestation of this claim is that music is good to the degree that it brings
2. Jerrold Levinson, Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2006), 189.
3. Ibid., 189-190.
4. Ibid., 189.
5. Ibid., 188-189.
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listeners pleasure. However, as argued to earlier, valuing music based on pleasure
will not ground objective value in music. The Brazilian natives singing Pahpam
Jarkwa gained much pleasure from the song and others of its kind, yet it seems
wrong to say that their pleasure makes the music good. They could simply be
mistaken, like the man who takes pleasure in rape fantasies.
There is further reason to think that the hedonic claim—that we should
value music based on how much pleasure it brings us—is false. We often listen to
music that makes us feel sad—in fact, we often seek it out.6 To make the dilemma
worse, the pieces that elicit the most sadness are often ones we praise as
masterpieces; Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony is a prime example of this. If the
hedonic claim is true, there is a problem of motivation and a problem of
evaluation. First, why do we choose to listen to music that we know will make us
feel sad? Second, why are the pieces that we value as masterpieces often the ones
that elicit the most sadness in listeners?
More attempts have been offered to solve this problem than I have room to
cover in this paper, but here is one that seems most promising. Kendall Walton
proposes that experiencing sadness is not itself unpleasant or bad, but rather the
situation that makes the sadness appropriate. Given a sad situation, having the
appropriate emotional reaction is desirable, perhaps even pleasant.7 As appealing
as this sounds, it seems difficult to deny that experiencing sadness really is
negative and unpleasant. We may be glad that we respond appropriately given a
sad situation, but it nonetheless seems that the sadness we experience itself is
unpleasant. In addition, hearing sad pieces like Tchaikovsky’s Sixth do not place
us in a truly sad situation, so our sad response would actually be inappropriate and
therefore not good. So, sad masterpieces still pose a large problem to using
pleasure as the basis for music’s value.
Neither does it seem possible to claim that a piece’s novelty or its
influence are the primary basis for its value. While a piece’s novelty can certainly
be a positive factor by showcasing a composer’s uniqueness and originality, there
are counter-examples to show why novelty cannot be the primary criterion for
good music. Brahms’ music was considered to be a conservative reaction against
the radically new music of Liszt and Wagner. His four symphonies are praised as
great for their mastery of the earlier Romantic tradition, though they certainly
were not very different or novel.

6. Aaron Smuts, Narrative, Emotion, and Insight, “Rubber Ring: Why do we listen to sad
songs?” (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 2.
7. Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the
Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 257.
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Levinson argues that a piece’s positive influence on the future of music is
an important component of its value, which seems correct to an extent. 8
However, this will not do as a primary basis for music’s value. Imagine a piece
that is magnificently composed, but for one reason or another remains
unpublished or is even destroyed. There are real examples of pieces that could
have been like this: Chopin’s famous posthumous Nocturne was not discovered
and published until twenty-six years after his death, and it quite possibly could
have remained unknown. It would have had no influence, but it is seems wrong to
think that, if so, it would have ceased to be valuable music. Indeed, it seems
counter-intuitive to think that discovering the work somehow makes it good when
it would not have been otherwise.
Having shown that the primary basis for value in music is not its
cognitive, moral, or emotional payoffs nor its novelty and influence, we can
conclude that the formal properties of a piece of music are the primary basis for
its value. Valuing music for its formal properties has the advantage of grounding
an objective value in music, since the formal properties are intrinsic to the work
itself. It also has the advantage of making sense of why we listen to music that
makes us sad; we experience the sadness of a work as an essential part of
understanding the piece and its formal properties.
Three objections might emerge at this point. First, one might object that it
is implausible that listeners judge a work based on formal properties if they are
not aware of them. Few listeners are trained in music analysis and theory.
However, the objection rests on a false assumption that because listeners are
unaware of the formal properties that make a particular piece good, those formal
properties cannot be what induces a positive response in the listener. We are often
affected by elements of an object even if we are unaware of those elements; for
example, we experience complex tastes in food even though we are often unaware
of the ingredients used to create the effect. It may be that when we listen to music,
we are similarly affected by the formal properties in a work even though we are
unaware of them. Listeners may be affected by a piece’s progression from tension
to resolution even if they cannot explain this feature of the piece further by
pointing to fully diminished chords resolving to major chords. They experience a
sense of familiarity and return when the theme from the piece’s beginning returns,
even if they cannot label it a recapitulation. Thus, the objection seems to miss the
mark.
A second problem is that many people, perhaps the majority, seem to
prefer music with poor formal properties to music that is formally excellent.
Formal masterpieces like Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony often go unnoticed,
while many popular music artists with far less concern for formal excellence are
8. Levinson, Contemplating Art, 192.
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more widely acclaimed. Why not believe that the music that is evaluated as good
by the greatest number of people is the best?
Firstly, majority opinion here counts for only so much. In order to
undermine my argument, the objector would have to argue that value in music is
based on one of the other options listed above. For example, majority opinion
may lend support to the thesis that pleasures makes music valuable, but I have
already argued against that possibility above.
Secondly, it is plausible that the majority of people are simply mistaken in
their evaluative process. Perhaps they are not in an epistemically responsible
position to make an appropriate judgment of music, lacking the relevant
background information. By analogy, many average people would prefer playing
or watching a checkers match to a chess match if they lack the relevant
background information needed to appreciate the nuances of the chess match.
However, few would affirm that checkers has more potential and value as a game
than chess.
Another objection against my conclusion might be that the defender of
formal properties must furnish and defend an account of what specific formal
properties make music good. The objector might say that if the proponent of
formal properties cannot provide an adequate list of formal criteria for evaluating
a piece of music, then we should be just as skeptical of formal properties as a
basis for musical value as we were of non-formal properties. We would not have
the ability to arbitrate between two opposing claims about a piece’s formal value
unless we have a list of formal properties to be used as criteria.
The objection has some merit, of course. But it is easy enough to imagine
the sorts of formal properties that might be relevant—properties such as
form/structure, unity, melody, harmony, rhythm, counterpoint, orchestration,
texture, and timbre.9 This list is just preliminary and is open to amendment (a
thorough exploration being outside of the scope of this paper), but it is consistent
with the way that music has come to be analyzed over time throughout music
history.
The issue with proposing aesthetic principles based on formal properties in
this way is that it can often fall prey to having counterexamples raised against it.
For instance, if one defines good art as “that which has unity among diversity,” an
objector may draw a set of squiggly lines of differing lengths as an example of
9. Some brief definitions of music analysis jargon: Unity in a musical work has to do
with how the material in one part of a piece is related to and woven into other parts of the piece.
The term “Counterpoint” refers to the relationship of two or more independent lines of music
occurring simultaneously. “Orchestration” refers to how the unique properties of the instruments
of an ensemble are used creatively and effectively. “Texture” refers to considerations about how
many voices in a piece of music are prominent and how those prominent voices are accompanied
and colored. “Timbre” refers to the purposeful use of tone in an instrument, utilizing various
registers and playing techniques and for unique colors.
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something that has unity among diversity, yet is clearly not good art. In music,
this may also be a salient objection for a proposed formal criterion. If one argues
that music is valuable insofar as it has complexity, for example, an objector can
point to certain compositions of the early and mid-twentieth century that were so
extremely complex as to be almost unplayable and unintelligible upon hearing.
Such a piece would exemplify complexity yet not be good music. However, my
proposed set of nine formal properties to be used as the criteria for evaluation in
music withstands attempts at making such counterexamples. Because I argue that
a valuable piece needs to positively exemplify the nine properties in conjunction
rather than any single one in isolation, it does not seem possible to come up with
counterexamples the way that an objector used the squiggly lines in the first
example. If a piece positively exhibits all nine criteria, it would seem to cease to
be an effective counterexample and quite plausibly be a good piece of music.
Because my aesthetic principles of value in music based on formal properties are
not as broad as the “unity among diversity” example was, it will be much more
difficult to counterexample.
Two points of clarification need to be made. First, all nine formal criteria
listed above might not apply to certain pieces of music. For example, it would
make little sense to fault a flute solo piece for its lack of orchestration or
counterpoint when it is not really possible for the piece to exemplify those
properties. The principle could be amended and restated thusly: “A piece of music
ought to evaluated based on the degree to which it exhibits [each of the nine
formal properties listed above], but only when the piece admits of that property.”
This way, the flute solo piece would not be evaluated negatively by its lack of
counterpoint or orchestration since it would not admit of counterpoint or
orchestration at all. Secondly, since pieces of music would be evaluated based on
the conjunction of the nine formal properties, the evaluation process would be
flexible enough to encompass differences of emphases in pieces across genres and
time periods in music history. For example, a Bach fugue would exemplify
counterpoint to a much greater degree than it would exemplify rhythmic elements,
but the strength and emphasis in its counterpoint would make up for its relative
weakness in other areas so that it could still be evaluated as a great piece. Even
though all nine of the formal properties I listed can contribute to a musical piece’s
value, a particular piece of music need not exemplify all nine to the same degree
in order to be considered great.
In conclusion, I have presented two arguments to defend the thesis that
formal properties, rather than non-formal properties, are the primary basis of
value in music. I also entertained potential objections against this conclusion,
explaining why my arguments withstand the objections. Though space constraints
prevented me from exploring all the issues thoroughly, I hope my arguments have
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been robust enough to show that value in music is based in its formal properties
rather than its informal properties.
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